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Abstract
Likelihood functions have been the central pieces of statistical inference. For dis-
crete choice data, conventional likelihood functions are specified by random utility
(RU) models, such as logit and tremble, which generate choice stochasticity through
an ”error”, or, equivalently, random preference.
For risky discrete choice, this paper explores an alternative method to construct
the likelihood function: Rational Expectation Stochastic Choice (RESC). In line with
Machina (1985), the subject optimally and deterministically chooses a stochastic choice
function among all possible stochastic choice functions; the choice stochasticity can
be explained by risk aversion and the relaxation of the reduction of compound lot-
tery. The model maximizes a simple two-layer expectation that disentangles risk and
randomization, in the similar spirit of Klibanoff et al. (2005) where ambiguity and
risk are disentangled.
The model is applied to an experiment, where we do not commit to a particular
stochastic choice function but let the data speak. In RESC, well-developed decision
analysis methods to measure risk attitude toward objective probability can also be ap-
plied to measure the attitude toward the implied choice probability. Stochastic choice
functions are structurally estimated to estimate the stochastic choice functions, and
use standard discrimination test to compare the goodness of fit of RESC and different
RUs. The RUs are Expected Utility+logit and other leading contenders for describing
decision under risk. The results suggest the statistical superiority of RESC over ”er-
ror” rules. With weakly fewer parameters, RESC outperforms different benchmark
RU models for 30% − 89% of subjects. RU models outperform RESC for 0% − 2% of
subjects. Similar statistical superiority is replicated in a second set of experimental
data.
Key Words Experiment; Likelihood Function; Maximum Likelihood Identification;
Risk Aversion Parameter; Clarke Test; Discrimination of Stochastic Choice Functions
1 Introduction
In 1912, a college student, Fisher fitted the probability mass function of a discrete data
set through his maximum likelihood procedure, trying to challenge the ”error theory”
and OLS popular at that time. He might not expect that his model later becomes the
dominating method in modeling discrete choice data. In the setting of discrete choice,
both theorists and experimentalists in economics confirmed that, even if ”the circum-
stances of choice seem in all relevant respects to be the same”, an individual does not
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always choose deterministically in the same choice tasks1, especially when the alterna-
tives are complicated prospects (Debreu 1959 page 3). The stochasticity in choice data
makes it difficult to explain the data with deterministic preference over the primitive.
Marschak, Debreu, Luce and others assumed that an individual always chooses a proba-
bility mass function (a.k.a. stochastic choice function) of the discrete alternatives, even
if the individual is forced to choose only one alternative.
It is, therefore, a standard practice since Marschak and Luce to model the choice
data with a stochastic choice function; the value of the stochastic choice function equals
the value of the likelihood function, which can be estimated through a maximum likeli-
hood procedure and discriminated by Likelihood Ratio Test (LRT) or its generalizations.
The recent applications of aforementioned procedure include but do not limit to medi-
cal decision (de Bekker-Grob, Ryan and Gerard 2012), policy evaluation, school choice
(Chen and Sonmez 2006), online rating system (Harper et al. 2005), job choice, food
choice (Allen and Rehbeck 2019a), location choice, urban planning, informetrics (Liu et
al. 2018), and decision under risk and uncertainty (Conte, Hey and and Moffatt 2011;
Georgalos 2018). It is broadly applied everywhere.
To derive the stochastic choice function, Valavanis-Vail (1957), Block and Marschak
(1957), and Marschak (1959) suggest ”stochastic utility”, ”random ordering”, or ”ran-
dom utility” (RU) based on Thurstone (1927). The RU model is equivalent to the so-call
”discrete choice” (DC) model2, that uses a deterministic preference functionals to predict
deterministic choices and an extra error component to capture the discrepancy between
the predicted choices and actual choices: the agent evaluates the utility of alternative f
as u(f ) + ǫ(f ). The error component ǫ(f ) is thus attributed to the randomness of pref-
erence, where the decision-makers are assumed to have randomly variating tastes or
make errors. Two typical examples of this class are probit (Thurstone 1927), which is
a DC model with normally distributed i.i.d. error, and logit (Luce 1958), a DC model
with i.i.d. extreme-value type II error. RU has been one of the most widely adopted
econometric model.
RU is a natural explanation of choice variation. For example, if a subject chose an
alternative for a portion of time, it seems natural to assume that she prefers this alter-
native only in this portion of time (Machina 1985). However, evidence in experimental
1Psychologists accepted ”stochastic choice” a bit earlier (Thurstone 1927); Davidson and Marshack (1957)
tried to advocate the stochasticity of choice to economists, who have been assuming that the preference is
deterministic and transitive.
2For example, see Straklescki (2019).
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studies suggest that fluctuating taste is not the sole source of stochasticity: when asked
to repeatedly choose from the same menu of alternatives, subjects usually make differ-
ent choices, even if the repetitive tasks are presented simultaneously3. Besides the taste
shocks, RU and DC might originate from noise or ”error-making” (tremble). In addi-
tion to the error term, RU and DC assume a deterministic ranking among the discrete
alternatives in the menu. However, both recent theoretical and experimental works re-
affirmed that in some decision tasks, there could be no alternative that is “clearly” better
than the others (for example Fudenberg et al. 2015 and Agranov and Ortoleva 2017).
Furthermore, in an experimental setting, the subjects’ choices are usually inconsistent
with the prediction of the deterministic utility for more than twenty percent of times
(for example Marschak 1959). It makes sense to attribute the small discrepancy to the
error-making, but does the consistently high ”error rate” solely due to error?
In an RU, choosing the error distribution is important: any deterministic utility plus
error can be represented with any other arbitrary deterministic utility plus some other
error distribution4. A straightforward implication is that a utility function with a risk
aversion parameter of 0.1 plus error is equivalent to the same utility function with a
risk aversion parameter of 100 plus another error distribution. Thurstone himself ad-
mitted the arbitrariness in picking error distribution. This is unsatisfactory (Cosslett
1983; Manski 1975; Chiong and Shum 2018) because arbitrarily choosing the error dis-
tribution will lead to the misspecification of the choice probability model. Additionally,
the analysts usually have no a priori knowledge about the distribution (Cosslet 1983;
Chiong and Shum 2018). So one might ask: what distributions fit the best and why?
Does ”explaining” choice randomness with preference randomness really explains the
ultimate source of randomness (Machina 1985)5?
In contrast to the fundamental assumptions of RU, most economists use a determin-
istic and transitive preference in their models despite of the stochasticity in the data.
3Tversky (1969), Camerer (1989), Starmer and Sugden (1989), Hey and Orme (1994), Carbone and Hey
(1995), Ballinger and Wilcox (1997), Hey (2001), Dwenger, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2018), Agranov and Or-
toleva (2017).
4This is a simple corollary to the fact that discrete choice rule is equivalent to a random utility model. For
any utility functions u,v and error distribution ǫ, there exists an error distribution ǫ′ such that u + ǫ = v + ǫ′ .
However, for any error distributions ǫ,ǫ′ , and any function u, there does not necessarily exist a utility function
v such that the equity holds (for example, see Strzalecki 2019).
5RU also limits the dependence of error distribution on the menu, history, or choice frequency (Machina
1985; Brady and Rehbeck 2016; Manzini and Mariotti 2014). Other important limits of RU can be found, for
example, in Bajari and Benkard (2003) and Echenique and Saito (2018).
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This dilemma was resolved by Machina (1985), who first suggested an alternative ap-
proach, Stochastic Choice Generated by Deterministic Preference (SCGDP), in which the
stochasticity originates from stable preference rather than unstable (i.e. random) pref-
erence over the lottery. Assume the choice functional assign the respective probabilities
(ρf ,ρg ) to the alternatives {f ,g}, then the individual must weakly prefer the generated
lottery (with {f ,g} as outcomes and (ρf ,ρg ) as probability) over any other generated lot-
teries (stochastic choices) or deterministic choices. This approach is more satisfying than
the random utility rules from a theoretical perspective (Carbone and Hey 1995; Cerreia-
Vioglio et al 2019). The first experimental evidence could be Sopher and Narramore
(2000).
There are several influential stories for SCGDP. Chew et al. (1991) propose a stochas-
tic choice model generated by deterministic preference relaxing betweenness. It allows
the discrimination of randomizing risk and objective risk. Fudenberg et al. (2015) first
axiomatize the stochastic choice generated by additive perturbed utility (APU) using
acyclicity; the stochasticity originates from a cost function. Another source could be
regret-minimizing, which is first suggested by Dwenger, Kübler and Weizsäcker (2018)
using field data of school choice. Cerreia-Vioglio et al (2019) propose ”deliberately”
stochastic choice, the SCGDP defining on lottery primitives and assuming the reduction
of compound lottery. In general, the stochastic choice can originate from the determin-
istic preferences for convexity (Machina 1985). As an inspirational example (Machina
1989), suppose a mum is to give an indivisible treat to one of her two children; in this
case, the mum prefers hedging, or ”balancing”, in the sense that the mum prefers to give
some expected reward to both of the two ”attributes” - her two children. Therefore, she
strictly prefers a coin-flip over the decisive allocation to one child6. Several studies have
used randomization devices to elicit similar ”mental coins”7.
Based on these pieces of evidence, this paper proposes an easily estimatable model,
namely Rational Expectation Stochastic Choice (RESC) model for decision under risk.
RESC is a parameterizable special case of SCGDP. The stochastic choice function is
6This relaxes consequentialism. We confine our modest effort within the scope of individual decision mak-
ing under risk, in-line with Machina (1989).
7Carbone and Hey (1995) was the first to discriminate SCGDP and RU. Sopher and Narramore (2000) first
suggest the consistency of mixing across permutations as the empirical evidence favoring SCGDP. Dwenger,
Kübler andWeizsäcker (2018) find extensive evidence in favor of SCGDP in both the field and the lab; Agranov
and Ortoleva (2017) find that subjects would switch their choice when the same task is repeated and even pay
for a physical randomizing device to randomize their choice.
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distribution-free and the decision rule is ”rational”8: the stochasticity in choices arises
from maximizing a well-defined preference functional - a simple expectation. RESC
postulates that an agent chooses probabilities to randomize her choice for lotteries. This
results in a new (compound) lottery for which its payoff in each state is the expected
payoff of those lotteries in that state, calculated based on the chosen probability for ran-
domization. The agent’s objective is to maximize the expected utility of the resulting
lottery. We discuss this potential thinking process of the agent in Section 2.1. In short,
the stochasticity in RESC arises from the hedging of negatively correlated acts and bal-
ancing the expected reward in each state:
ρ∗ = argmax
ρ
EPu(ρf f + ρgg),
Where P is a probability measure of the states of nature. f and g are state-dependent
lotteries that match each state of nature to a payoff.
A more general formulation allows the discrimination of the risk attitude towards
objective probability and the attitude toward implied choice ”probability” (Appendix
D). Many seminal studies suggest that the relaxation of the reduction of compound lot-
tery is both normatively and empirically appealing (For example, Segal 1990). In our
analysis, there are two sources of uncertainty: the objective probability exogenously
given by the experimenter, and the random choice ”probability” endogenously ”given”
by the subject herself (flip a mental coin) or the nature (flip a physical coin). The choice
”probability” needs not to be an exact probability in the sense of Chipman (1963). It
is well-known that the attitudes towards risk and uncertainty is associated with pes-
simism, source, and trust9. So it is not too unnatural to hypothesize that the subject
is pessimistic when facing the probability set by someone else, but not so pessimistic
when dealing with the random choice probability ”set” by the subject herself or the na-
ture, because she trusts herself or the nature more than trusts others. In game theory,
for instance, mixed strategies are based on the expected value of the payoff calculated
based on the assigned probabilities: the agents are assumed to be risk-neutral when
8It is said to be ”rational” in three senses. First, in the sense of classical economics, the preference is rational
then it must be transitive and complete; a choice function c is rational if it can be written as c ∈ argmaxcU(c)
where U is a deterministic utility function (for example, see Mascolell et al. 1995; Firsch 1927). Second,
the maximization of expectation is considered the ”rational behavior” (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944)
in decision analysis, game theory, artificial intelligence, finance, cognitive science and behavioral economics
(Tversky and Kahneman 1989). Third, the choice rule cannot be explained by ”error”.
9For example, see Abdellaoui et al (2011); Dimmock et al (2016). Bohnet et al (2008) find that people are
more risk averse when dealing with other people than when dealing with nature.
5
evaluating the random choice ”probability”. Indeed, using the second-order model, the
empirical finding in Appendix D suggests that most subjects are risk-averse if the prob-
ability is exogenous, but they are not risk-averse if it is endogenous. Suppose that the
attitudes are the same, then the reduction axiom still holds, the indifference curves in
the Marschak-Machina triangle become linear and RESC degenerates to the determinis-
tic EU (Machina 1985). This might give a modest insight into the quest for the source of
choice stochasticity.
RESC have several advantages, for example, the source of data stochasticity has an
explanation, the analysts do not need to worry about choosing error distributions, tra-
ditional functional forms for EU can still be used, and the model can be estimated with
the similar methods.
The purpose of constructing a likelihood function is to fit it with the data. This
paper uses two sets of binary choice data to investigate the empirical performance of
RESC and RUs through a maximum-likelihood procedure and discrimination tests. The
experimental task (section 3) is completing several problems where each problem asks
one to choose one lottery from a menu of two lotteries. The outcomes of the lotteries are
monetary prizes and depend on the realization of equally-likely-occurring states. The
subject is presented with a pair of alternatives and asked to choose one; she is assumed
to choose the first alternative (f ) with probability ρf and the other one with probability
ρg = 1−ρf (Markschak 1957; Debreu 1959). One might still be in doubt that why do we
use the stochastic choice function to model the deterministic choice data. In fact, this
has long been the standard: although stochasticity was not introduced in the objects of
choice, the subject can ”introduce it in the act of choice” (Debreu 1959)10.
At individual choices level, we useMaximum Likelihood procedures to estimate RESC
and RUs. The deterministic component for RU we have considered are Expected Util-
ity(EU), Quiggin’s (1982) RankDependent Expected Utility (RDEU), Regret Theory (RT)11
and Salience Theory under Risk (ST) (Bordalo et al 2012).
Among known generalizations, RDEU and EU (both with RU) have long been the
”leading” benchmark RUs in measuring risk, not only because of their mathematical
tractability, but also because of their statistical superiority and empirical robustness12
(Conte, Hey and and Moffatt 2011). Despite shortfalls in explaining some named para-
10See also Markschak 1957. Harless and Cameron 1994 also argue that randomness occurs during the act of
choice
11Bell (1980, 1982, 1983, 1985). Loomes and Sugden (1982)
12As Machina suggested, this is possibly due to many non-EUs relaxing independence are in fact locally EU
6
doxes, EU proves its statistical superiority over most of its generalization through stan-
dard discrimination tests (for example, see Hey and Orme, 1994).
The payoffs of the lotteries are state-dependent. Thus non-Probability Sophistication
(PS)13 models are also considered. PS models include EU, Subjective EU, Choquet EU,
Prospect Theory, and RDEU. There are two notable non-PS models under risk: Regret
Theory and Salience Theory14. Non-PS preference can be normative even if the lotteries
are the vNM simple lotteries without correlation specified (Epstein and Halevy 2019).
SinceMarschak and Luce, it has been the standard to structurally estimate the stochas-
tic choice function by maximum likelihood procedure and compare the models by dis-
crimination tests15. To our surprise, only one work has implemented this process to
compare a non-RU SCGDP model with RU. Carbone and Hey (1995) might be the first
to structurally estimate a non-RU SCGDP model – Chew et al (1991)’s Quadratic Utility
– but it fits well for only one out of forty-four subjects. To our knowledge, all other im-
portant experimental works on differentiating SCGDP and RU did not implement like-
lihood discrimination; they were unable to quantitatively conclude on the goodness of
fit of a stochastic choice function. Utilizing maximum likelihood estimation and sophis-
ticated discrimination process, Section 4 manages to differentiate SCGDP and RU and
suggests an alternative method of measuring risk under the classical setting of discrete
choices. Section 5 repeats the analysis using data from another experiment.
2 The Model and Method
We layout the choice problem in a simple three-equally-likely states case. The model can
be extended to the problem of different states with differing probabilities with trivial
effort. A problem is to choose an alternative from a menu of two lotteries {f ,g}. We
use the notation f to indicate a typical alternative on the menu. The prizes (monetary
payoffs) of the lotteries depend on three states of the world s ∈ S = {s1, s2, s3} eventuates.
Each lottery is a probability distribution that generates from the mapping from S to
a prize space X ⊂ R, that is f (si ) = fi , si ∈ S and fi ∈ X. In the experimental setting of this
paper, the states are equally likely to occur, therefore p(s1) = p(s2) = p(s3) =
1
3 . Table 1
13PS means the preferences over lotteries depend exclusively on the independent probability distributions
of the outcomes.
14Refer to Appendix C for details.
15Such as LRT for nested models and Vuong/Clarke test for non-nested models
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illustrates the problem.
Table 1: Menu 1
s1(p1 =
1
3 ) s2(p2 =
1
3 ) s3 (p3 =
1
3 )
f f1 f2 f3
g g1 g2 g3
2.1 Rational Expectation Stochastic Choice (RESC)
We emphasize that the optimizing object of RESC is a probability vector specifying how
to randomize between two lotteries. The purpose of this intentional randomization16
is to obtain a two-stage lottery that gives a higher expectation of utility than the two
individual lotteries. The key idea of RESC is the preference for convexity (Marchina 1985):
a probabilistic (hence convex) combination of f and g is preferred to the two individual
alternatives 17.
Our model implies that the decision makers’ evaluation of a simple lottery with ob-
jective probability can be different from the evaluation of a simple lottery with ran-
domizing probability; this is supported by recent evidence that the subjects evaluate an
objective coin differently in comparing to a mental coin (Agranov and Ortoleva 2017).
We now discuss the potential thinking process underpinning RESC. Figure 1(a)18
illustrates what we usually assume for an agent ascribes to make the discrete choice.
The agent is determined to choose either f and g , doing so she would end up with a
lottery with three possible outcomes.
In RU, the observed stochasticity in choices is captured by error. However, classical
RU might not be able to explain the subject when she relaxes consequentialism: the
utility of choosing f might depend on the stochastic choice probability she has assigned
to g (Machina 1989).
The alternative evaluation process can also be demonstrated in Figure 1(b), the agent
16The subject could be either conscious or subconscious.
17The first experimental evidence can be found in Sopher and Narramore (2000). The experimental task
here explicitly allows the subject to choose a convex combination over two lotteries. The authors find that
preference for mixtures is common.
18We borrow these figures from Ke and Zhang (2019), where they use them for preferences over Anscombe-
Aumann acts.
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Figure 1: Two Ways of Perceiving Pairwise State-dependent Lottery Choice Problem
(a) Classical interpretation: The agent
moves first to deterministically choose
one lottery, then natures moves to de-
cide the realization of the state. There
is only one one-stage risk that repre-
sented by the tree branches originates
from either f or g .
(b) RESC: Nature decides the state first,
then the agent needs to consider how to
randomize conditioned the occurrence
of each state. The branch originates
from the states represents randomiza-
tion risk, which is determined by the
agent herself.
would start from the point view of the states 19. Even if the problem specifies the ob-
jective time as in Figure 1(a), the subjective timing and objective timing does not have
to be the same (Ke and Zhang, 2019). The agent first conditions on the occurrence of
a state, and then thinks of what is resulted from her action. For example, if state 1
were to happen, by randomization between f and g , the agent gets an expected value of
ρf f (s1) + ρgg(s1)
20.
The agent goes through all three states and looks for an optimal ρ∗ to obtain a new
lottery of three outcomes that may produce a more desirable distribution of outcomes
than f and g individually.
Table 2 provides an extreme example to show the potential advantage of randomiza-
19This idea was introduced by Saito (2015) to explain the preferences of convexity. Their primitives are
Anscombe-Aumann acts.
20We also estimated the general version of RESC by replacing this expected value with EU so the risk attitude
toward randomizing probability can be separately estimated. The subjects can be viewed as second-order
expected utility maximizers (Segal 1990). Doing so would involve introducing an extra parameter in the utility
function. We found this generalization extra statistical improvement for only 11 subjects. Most subjects are
not risk-averse when dealing with the stochastic choice probability instead of facing the objective probability
(Appendix D)
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Table 2: An Example of Convex Combination
s1(p1 =
1
3 ) s2(p2 =
1
3 ) s3 (p3 =
1
3 )
f 10 4 1
g 2 8 11
k = 0.5f +0.5g 6 6 6
The last row shows the resulting lottery k if an agent chooses
to randomize f and g by probability (0.5,0.5). The outcome
of k in each state is the expected value (in terms of (0.5,0.5))
of two outcomes of f and g in that state.
tion where an agent obtains a lottery with reduced risk generated from objective proba-
bility, if she ascribes to the thought process as indicated in Figure 1(a).
We now write RESC formally as follows:
(ρ∗f ,ρ
∗



























ρf + ρg = 1
0 ≤ ρf ≤ 1
0 ≤ ρg ≤ 1
and u(·) is a utility function such as Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) or Con-
stant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA). These are the standard assumptions in the MLE
of risk aversion parameter. Appendix A gives the mathematical derivation of how to
calculate the optima in equation (1).
We argue that it is the innate intention of randomization makes the observed choice
data appear to be stochastic. Note equation (1) gives a very neat way of constructing the






Suppose for problem n the actual choice cn = f (g), then the likelihood of observing this
choice is assigned as ρf (ρg ). For N independent number of problems, the sum of log-
21We do not use the alternative CRRA utility function in this paper because the experimental parameters
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[1 0] if cn = f
[0 1] if cn = g,
and ◦ denotes operation for Hadmard product.
The advantage of RESC is that it deals with preferences and stochasticity simultane-
ously. RESC allows a more accurate way of predicting people’s choices in the case when
choices have to be made deterministically in a one-shot fashion, which is the nature of
many real-life choices.
2.2 Model of Deterministic Choice plus Error
Under RU model, the utility of an alternative Ũ(f ) consists of the evaluation of an alter-
native v(f ) that is determined by a preference functional and an error part ǫ̃(f ):
Ũω(f ) = v(f ) + ǫ̃(f ) (4)
The error ǫ could possibly depend on the whole menu but it is assumed to be only
dependent on f in the mainstream theoretical and empirical literature of random util-
ity or discrete choice. Because it is well-known that the menu-dependent error model
trivially explains everything. For empirical analysis, we choose the most popular and
standard RU model, Logit (Luce 1958), which assumes ǫ to be i.i.d. extreme value. The
Logit choice probability is as follows22.
ρf =
ev(f )
ev(f ) + ev(g)
. (5)
22Note this equation implies the variance of the ǫ is π
2
6 . In general one can add an extra scale parameter σ
such that the variance becomes σ2 π
2
6 . Then equation (5) becomes
ρf =
ev(f )/σ
ev(f )/σ + ev(g)/σ
.
If v(·) takes a linear form then scale parameter does not affect the ratio of the parameters in v(·) (Chapter 3,
Train 2009).
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The interpretation is the likelihood of choosing an alternative is proportional to its eval-
uation compared to the sum of the two evaluations and the error is decreasing with the
advantage in evaluation.





log((ρf ,1− ρf ) ◦ I ) (6)
where the arguments of L are the parameters in the preference functionals. For example,
in EU, the argument can be the risk aversion parameter in a CARA utility function.
We consider the following most relevant deterministic theories for our problem: Ex-
pected Utility (EU), Rank Dependent Expected Utility (Quiggin 1982), hereafter RDEU,
and two non-PSmodels: Salience Theory under Risk (ST) and Regret Theory (RT). For all
these theories we assume CARA. The preference functional v(·) for these deterministic
theories are defined in Appendix C.
2.3 Comparison of RESC and RU: An Illustration
In this subsection, we point out the major difference between RU models and RESC.
Consider the choice task 1 and 2 with different menus: {f ,g} and {f ,h}. There are
two states of nature, s1 and s2. f pays zero dollar in s1 and one dollar in s2. g pays zero
dollar in s1 and 1.01 dollars in s2. h pays 1.01 dollars in s1 and zero dollar in s2. The
probability of s1 and s2 are equal. The setting is summarized in the following Table 3.
The choice probability predicted by i.i.d. RU (EU+logit) and Random Expected Util-
ity (Gul and Pesendorfer 2006) is obvious. The error in an RU model only depends on
the specific alternative. Therefore the choice probability in Tasks 1 and 2 would not
change in an RUmodel. It is well known that if the error depends on the menu, then the
RU model just trivially explains everything.
In reality, many subjects would not regard Tasks 1 and 2 as the same task. RESC is
one approach to rectifies this limit of the RU model.
The prediction of RESC in Task 1 and Task 2’ is obvious. In Task 2’, the subject
chooses to equally split her choice probability not because of ”error”, but because of a
desire of balancing the expected payoff in two ”attributes”: the two states23. If we fur-
ther assume ”continuity” which is assumed in most of the mainstream stochastic choice
23This is suggested in the spirit of Machina (1989)’s mum example of normative decision under risk.
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Table 3: Choice Probability under Different Theories
Choice Probability
RU (iid) REU RESC
s1 s2
Task 1 Lottery f 0 1 ∼40% 0% 0%
Lottery g 0 1.01 ∼60% 100% 100%
Task 2 Lottery f 0 1 ∼40% 0% ∼40%
Lottery h 1.01 0 ∼60% 100% ∼60%
Task 2’ Lottery f 0 1 50% 50% 50%
Lottery h′ 1 0 50% 50% 50%
theories, then the stochastic choice ρ is a continuous function (or correspondence). In
task 2, intuitively, where h′ is altered a little bit to become h, the choice probability
should also be only altered a little bit. Therefore, in task 2, the subject would still assign
some probability to lottery f , otherwise continuity is violated. The experimental setting
is similar to but more complicated than this example.
3 Experiment and Data
The data used in this study was obtained in a research university’s decision lab from 89
subjects drawn from both graduate and undergraduate students. There were 28 pair-
wise choice tasks over two state-dependent lotteries as in Table 1. Appendix B presents
a screenshot of the sample choice task and the list of all tasks. The subjects were told at
the beginning that the computer would randomly draw a choice task (Random-Lottery
Incentive System) and draw a state of that choice task to decide their payments after
they finish all tasks. The sequence of the tasks was randomized. Each subject’s choice of
the lotteries (lottery 1 or lottery 2) in each task was recorded. Therefore, the dataset is a
matrix of size 28 by 89 with the element of the binary number 1 or 2. Average reward is
∼ 13 dollars. Completing time was about 30 min. Four sessions were run. A subject can
only participate in one session. No data were excluded from the analysis.
All subjects signed relevant consent forms and all experimenters took relevant train-
13
ing. The experiment was approved by the ethical approval committee.
4 Estimation Strategy and Discrimination Results
This paper uses Maximum Likelihood procedures to estimate the parameters in stochas-
tic choice functions (RESC and RU) at an individual subject level24. The sum of log-
likelihood for RESC and RU models are defined in equation (3) and equation (6) respec-
tively. In terms of RUmodels, we stick with the standard logit form (5) in Luce’s original
work25.
Figure 2 shows the histogram of the estimated risk aversion parameter from RESC
and EU. In the estimation we constraint r between −0.3 and 0.3. Values outside these
bounds imply extremely risk-seeking or risk aversion and they are unidentifiable given
the experimental parameters. To set a constraint for r is standard in structural estima-
tion literature 26
24There are no analytical solutions for the optimizing of the choice problem, therefore there are no explicit
solutions to maximize the sum of log-likelihood functions either. We write the algorithms for optimization in
MatLab.
25The main result remains similar when using other RUs such as more general forms of logit, probit, and
tremble.
26For example, see Georgalos (2019). Some intuition of these numbers: under r = −0.3, the Certainty Equiv-
alent of the lottery (22,0.5;0,0.5) is 21; under r = 0.3 it is 2. A detailed description of the intuition of the
boundaries of risk aversion parameters and the unidentifiability beyond the bound can be found in Holt and
Laury (2002). The main result remains robust when the boundary is shifted.
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Figure 2: Estimated Risk Aversion Parameter r
y axis is the number of subjects. x axis is the ML estimated risk aversion parameter
r as in equation (2). ”0.3+” means 0.3 or higher. ”-0.3-” means -0.3 or lower. A
higher r indicates higher risk aversion. Values less (more) than −0.3 (0.3) suggest
extreme risk seeking (aversion) and are unidentifiable in the dataset. Consistent
with previous experimental studies, the majority of the subjects are risk averse. On
average, r is higher in RESC than in EU + Logit.
We can see under RESC risk aversion is higher than EU. This is probably due to the
choice of a riskier lottery is considered to be hedging in RESC but is considered to be an
error in EU.
RESC does not nest any of the RU models; therefore it is standard to use the Clarke
test (2003) to compare the goodness of fit of two non-nested competing likelihood func-
tions (Imai and Tingley 2012). Vuong (1989) is the other canonical test to compare
non-nested models. However, Clarke (2003, 2007) demonstrate the former test is more
suitable with small sample size and likelihood ratios exhibiting sharp peaks than a nor-
mal distribution, which is our case as shown in Figure 3.
In recent literature, Clarke test is generally considered appropriate and sufficient
to discriminate stochastic choice rules, especially under risk and uncertainty (Among
many others, see Hey and Panaccione 2011; Panagiotelis and Czado and Joe 2012; Hey
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and Pace 2014; Wilcox 2015); no more robustness check is usually performed.
Figure 3: Histogram of the Log of the Likelihood Ratios
x axis the individual likelihood ratio of EU+logit to RESC under each
problem. It is calculated based on the estimated parameter from MLE.
y axis is the number of problems. All subjects’ data in all problems
were pooled to get this histogram. The red line was the fitted normal
distribution curve. It is clear the distribution has a higher peak than the
normal distribution.
In the Clarke test, the null hypothesis is that the two competing models are equally
good, hence on a particular problem the probability of the log-likelihood for one model
being larger than the probability of the other model is 12 .
Let L1 and L2 denote the individual log-likelihoods of the 28 problems, which are
calculated using the estimated parameters. When the twomodels have the same number





















1 if L2 > L1
0 if L2 ≤ L1
Under the null hypothesis T has a binomial distribution with parameters n = 28
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and p = 0.5. Thus an observation greater than 19 rejects the null hypothesis at the 5%
significance level.
Figure 4: Clarke Test Between EU and RESC
On the left panel, x axis is the number of problems that EU+logit has a higher
likelihood than RESC for each subject. If the number was more than 19, then
we rejected the null that the two models perform the same at 5% and concluded
that EU+Logit was better for this subject. There was only 2 out of 89 subjects
that EU+logit was significantly better. The right panel reversed the comparison
by counting the numbers that RESC has a higher likelihood than the EU. It shows
27/89 subjects’ data fitted better in RESC.
Both RSEC and EU have one parameter to estimate, therefore individual likelihoods
can be directly compared. In general, the individual likelihood of models with more
parameters is penalized by log(N )/N , where N is the number of the extra parameters.
Therefore, when we compare RESC with ST, the individual likelihoods of ST is sub-
tracted by log(28)/28 since ST has one more parameter. The results of all comparisons
between models using the Clarke test are summarized in the following Table 4. It shows
the advantage of RESC, compared to both PS theories (EU and RDEU) and non-PS theo-
ries (ST and RT).
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Table 4: Clarke Test Results
(a) RESC vs EU+error
EU better RESC better neither better
2% 30% 68%
(b) RESC vs RDEU+error
RDEU better RESC better neither better
0% 89% 11%
(c) RESC vs ST+error
ST better RESC better neither better
0 55% 45%
(d) RESC vs RT+error
RT better RESC better neither better
0% 57% 43%
5 Replication
As a robustness check, we replicate the analysis using another set of data first analyzed
in Agranov and Ortoleva (2017). This experiment consisted of four parts of different
settings. We use the data from the part that the experimental task wasmaking a pairwise
state-dependent lottery choice. The randomization device was the same. There were
four possible states for the lottery and subjects were told the realization of the state
would be determined by a computerized four-sided dice. There were 7 choice problems
and each problem was repeated three times in a row, which the subjects were informed.
The figure in Appendix B shows the 7 problems. Random lottery incentive system was
also adopted. The subjects were 80 university students. Therefore the dataset is a matrix
of row 21 by 80 with binary number 1 or 2.
The original analysis follows a simple descriptive fashion: if a subject did not switch
preference in all repetitions, then it is concluded that the individual makes deterministic
choice. If the subject did switch, then it is concluded that the individual makes stochas-
tic choice. However, since deterministic choice is a special case of stochastic choice, even
if the subject makes deterministic choice in all three repetitions, we cannot make sure
that the subject will always choose deterministically if the task is changed or more repe-
tition is administrated. This paper discriminates the deterministic plus error model and
SCGDP using sophisticated discrimination tests.
We fit the data into the same RESC and EU+logit as defined in Section 2. For both, the
same CARA utility function, as in equation (2), is adopted. The same standard Clarke
test was adopted: since there are 21 problems, a model giving more than 14 higher
likelihood fits better than the other at a significance of 5% level. Figure 5 indicates that
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RESC strikingly outperforms EU+logit. The null hypotheses that RESC is not superior
than EU+logit are rejected for all subjects. The null hypotheses that EU+logit is not
better than RESC cannot be rejected for any of the subjects. This is consistent with the
message from the original paper - a large majority of subjects exhibit ”stochastic choice”
and this choice inconsistency in repetitions is difficult to be explained by deterministic
preference theories and RUs.
Many have been questioning the original 2017 experimental results. For example,
some of them believe the subjects are ”framed” to randomize, because of the repetitive
setting of the experiment.
However, it is worth noting that, even if the subject does not seem to ”choose stochas-
tically” in the repetitions27, her preference is sometimes still incompatible with deter-
ministic EU or EU+error. The reasoning is as follows. A subject’s choice over two dif-
ferent lotteries gives us information about her risk attitudes under EU (curvature of a
utility function). If we fix a particular form of the utility function, then we can use that
choice to calculate a one-sided range of risk parameter in the utility function28. For ex-
ample, suppose a subject consistently chooses one lottery in one set of the three, which
implies risk-averse. Meanwhile, the same subject’s consistent choices in another set can
indicate risk-seeking. One can always trivially argue this is due to ”error”, but it is dif-
ficult to imagine a subject would make the same ”error” three times in a row. We have
identified 25 subjects who ”did not make stochastic choices” based on simple descrip-
tive statistics; however, among them, there are 10 subjects are of the type of that cannot
be explained by EU well while RESC predicts their choice much more nicely. The other
subjects might be explained by EU, but RESC still fits significantly better.
27i.e. they always choose the same object in repetition. This is determined by using simple descriptive
statistics.
28For example, consider the choice task of Hard3 as the figure in Appendix B. If a subject had chosen the
lottery in the second row, then we know her risk aversion r > 0.0042 as in the CARA utility function (2).
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Figure 5: Clarke Test Between EU+error and RESC
The x-axis is the total number that one model has a higher likelihood than the
other among one subject’s all 21 problems. By Clarke test of non-nested models, a
number of more than 14 indicates the former model fits better at 5% confidence in-
terval. There were 80 subjects in total. RESC fits significantly better than EU+error
for all subjects. EU+error fits significantly better than EU+error for no subjects.
6 Discussion
The results seem surprising are not surprising because it is known that explaining ran-
domness in data with randomness of preference still does not explain the source of ran-
domness (Machina 1985). Estimating utility function from binary choice data can often
be not very successful due to the randomness. When the utility function suggests the
subject prefers one alternative to the other, it might make sense to attribute the small
discrepancy in choice probability to errors. However, suppose one subject consistently
chooses an alternative for 55% of the time, can we claim that she strictly prefers one
alternative to the other? When the deterministic utility function suggests she should be
choosing it for sure, can we claim this choice probability of 55% instead of 100% is due
to error? How could we refute the hypothesis that she chooses the randomizing proba-
bility by an instinctive optimization process? Of course, future theoretical investigation
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and empirical evidence is needed to thoroughly understand the rationale behind.
Similar evidence can be found in the psychology and evolutionary dynamics lit-
erature. For example, the well-documented phenomena of ”probability weighting” is
widely observed in human and animals.
s1(p1 =
1
3 ) s2(p2 =
1
3 ) s3 (p3 =
1
3 )
f 10 4 1
g 2 8 11
k = 0.5f +0.5g 6 6 6
The last row shows the resulting lottery k if an agent chooses
to randomize f and g by probability (0.5,0.5). The outcome
of k in each state is the expected value (in terms of (0.5,0.5))
of two outcomes of f and g in that state.
Expected utility maximizer will always not to perform probability weighting.
The theory can be applied in building more efficient machine intelligence (AI). There
are two primary goals of building AI: first, build AI that makes better decisions; second,
build the AI that makes decisions just like a human. All decisions in real world are to
some extend risky. For an abstract example (1.1,0) and (0,1), with the probability P(s1) =
s2 There are three way of designing AI: 1) Each AI program optimize a deterministic
expected utility. 2) Each AI optimize a deterministic expected utility plus some error. 3)
More recently, Zhang et al (2014 PNAS) have proposed a binary-choice model that
provides an evolutionary framework for generating a variety of behaviors that are con-
sidered anomalous from the perspective of traditional economic models (i.e., loss aver-
sion, probability matching, and bounded rationality). In this framework, natural selec-
tion yields standard risk-neutral optimizing economic behavior when reproductive risk
is idiosyncratic (i.e., uncorrelated across individuals within a given generation). How-
ever, when reproductive risk is systematic (i.e., correlated among individuals within a
given generation), some seemingly irrational behaviors, such as probability matching
and loss aversion, become evolutionarily dominant.
2019 ( PNAS)
The example of AI is more suitable for a ”Rational” Stochastic Choice rather than a
RU-based stochastic choice because unlike human, AI does not necessarily need to have
variating taste or ”make errors”.
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In sum, the EU maximizer appears to be a RESC decision maker in a single choice
if one of the following conditions hold: 1) the agents are sufficiently altruistic: they
maximize the EU of the whole group; 2) the agent is an individual EU maximizer and is
expected to make the same or similar decisions for multiple time in its whole lifespan.
Future Perspectives
Future improvements include replicating with health discrete choice data, applying the
same technique into multi-attribute binary choices, applying the model into decision
under ambiguity, further theoretically axiomatization of this model, and comparing this
model with other nascent stochastic choice models such as REU. Additionally, this pa-
per primarily focuses on lotteries with determined correlations. To apply the model to
simple lotteries with non-deterministic but ambiguous correlation, one might adopt the
thoughts in Epstein and Halevy (2019): the subjects might have a subjective belief of the
unknown correlation.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper introduces a distribution-free approach tomodeling discrete choice andmea-
suring risk. Without assuming any error distribution, the functional form of RESC is
even simpler thanmany of the conventional tractable models such as the EU+error mod-
els. Many commonly used features and methods in the EU, such as estimating the risk-
averse parameter with CRRA or CARA utility function, are applicable in the same way
in RESC. In this case, RESC’s statistical superiority might because the subjects strategi-
cally choose a probability mass function to optimize their expectation, rather than the
randomization due to an ”error”. The second reason for statistical superiority might
be directly fitting the stochastic choice with one parameter. This was done in spirit of
Alpha Go Zero’ improvement, in which the policy function and value function are com-
bined to one, contrary to the separately estimated functions in Alpha Go (Silver et al.
2017 Nature). In classic RU, people often fit the deterministic component with many
parameters, when fitting the stochastic component - error distribution - with zero or
one parameter. As discussed in the introduction, in an RU model, the error distribu-
tion could be more important than the deterministic component. Therefore, the classic
application of RU models might involve an over-fitting and over-modeling of the deter-
ministic component, while under-fitting and under-modeling the stochastic component.
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In contrast, RESC models both components with one variable, reaching a natural bal-
ance. RESC ranks the stochastic choice functions but does not rank the primitives –
everything has its place; no one is superior to the others.
Appendix - Literature Relations on Stochastic Choice Gen-
erated by Deterministic Preferences
The strain of literature initiated by Machina (1985) does provide richer information
about the origin of choice stochasticity. The most influential examples are Fudenberg
et al’s (2015) Additive Perturbed Utility (APU), Ortoleva et al’s (2017, 2019) ”delib-
erate stochastic” (DS) and cautious stochastic choice (CSC), and Dwenger, Kübler and
Weizsäcker (2018)’s regret minimization. The first one generates stochastic choice be-
cause of a cost function, which could be meaningfully interpreted as the cost of learning
or the cost of attention. The second one introduces a max-min structure, which can be
interpreted as being cautious or pessimistic. The third one suggests that deterministic
choice generates more aftermath regret. RESC generates stochastic choice by balancing
the expected payoff between different states.
The intersect between SCGDP and RU model is not an empty-set. APU is neither a
special case nor a generalization RU model, though both logit and probit, due to their
stringent functional form, are special cases of both RU and APU. There are several differ-
ent characteristics of SCGDP and RU. As the first effort to axiomatize stochastic choice
function with acyclicity, APU assumes an elegant and estimable functional form. APU
inherited both the advantages of SCGDP - generated by deterministic preference - and
the advantages of RU - the separation of the deterministic component and the stochastic
component. An important generalization of APU into multi-attribute alternatives can
be found in Allen and Rehbeck (2019ab). RESC cannot be expressed as APU or RU be-
cause it can violate regularity. Additionally, APU and RU usually consider the discrete
set as the menu, while RESC considers the acts or state-dependent lottery as primitive.
Both APU and RESC can violate stochastic transitivity. Both models cannot be repre-
sented with a utility plus error. Both models have well-defined parameters ready to
be estimated. RESC is similar to DS and CSC, in the sense that both relax regularity
and both may be considered the relaxing of consequentialism. RESC is different from
RU and CSC as RESC is a simple maximization of expectation, considers the space of
acts, relaxes probability sophistication, and most importantly, relaxes the reduction of
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compound lottery to allow the discrimination of the objective probability and stochastic
choice probability.
There are several other lines of literature try to rationalize the stochastic component
in choices. Motivated by neurophysiological evidence, one possible source of stochastic
choice is considered to be the noise in signal and signal-processing (Woodford 2014);
in this line of research the preference is not necessarily fluctuating but the cognitive
processes can. Bounded rationality is sufficient to generate the stochastic choice in a de-
terministic setting, even if the indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle are
linear (Stoye 2015). Another approach is based on the bounded rationality of decision-
maker who optimally acquires costly information (among others, see Sims 2003; Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy 2019). The rational inattention models maximize a generalized expec-
tation minus attention cost. It explains better than random utility models in decision
with time variation (Webb 2019) and decisions with information acquisition. The earli-
est dynamic stochastic choice model generated by optimizing long-term rewards might
be credited to Thompson (1933); it is plausible that stochastic choice is a result of sam-
pling and learning (Natenzon 2017). Our experimental set-ups control the uncertainty-
learning factor of randomizing choices, because only the single-period choice under risk
is considered: there is no ambiguity involved.
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AppendixA - Rational Expectation Stochastic Choice (RESC)
Optima
A problem is a choice from a menu of two state-dependent lotteries {f ,g}. The prizes
(monetary payoffs) of the lottery depend on three states of the world s ∈ S{s1, s2, s3} even-
tuates. We assume that p(s1) = p(s2) = p(s3) =
1
3 . Table 5 illus the problem.
Table 5: Menu 1
s1(p1 =
1
3 ) s2(p2 =
1
3 ) s3 (p3 =
1
3 )
f f1 f2 f3
g g1 g2 g3
The RESC theory postulates the subject randomizes her choice over f and g . The
objective of choice is the probability of choosing f , denoted by ρ ( the probability of
choosing g then is 1ρ.) If state i occurred, the expected (expectation over the random-
ization between f and g) payoff in state i then is
xi =i +(1− ρ)gi = ρ(fi − gi ) + gi
RESC theory further postulates the subject wants tomaximize the following expected
utility :
U(ρ) = u(x1) +u(x2+u(x3)
where
xi = ρfi + (1− ρ)gi , , i = 1,2,3.
The first order condition is
U ′(ρ) = u′(x1)(f1 − g1) +u
′(x2)(f2 − g2) +u
′(x3)(f3 − g3) (7)
CARA utility function






Note that u′(x) = e−rx. The first order condition (7)becomes
e−x1(f1 − g1) + e
−x2(f2 − g2) + e
−x3(f3 − g3) = 0.
which has the following explicit form
e−(ρf1+(1−ρ)g1)(f1 − g1) + e
−(ρf2+(1−ρ)g2)(f2 − g2) + e
−(ρf3+(1−ρ)g3)(f3 − g3).
There is no explicit solution for the equation above. Figure 6 gives the plot of U(ρ) and
its first derivative U ′(ρ) = ∂U
∂ρ
against ρ. It shows U(ρ) is nicely concave and U ′(ρ) is
monotone with one unique root. The parameters used for the plot are f1 = 15, f2 = 0, f3 =
3, g1 = 0, g2 = 6, g3 = 10, r = 0.3.
Figure 6: RESC Objective Function and its First Derivative
CRRA utility function
















1−r r , 1
log(x) r = 1
Noting u′(x) = x−r , then first order condition (7) becomes
x−r1 (f1 − g1) + x
−r
2 (f2 − g2) + x
−r
3 (f3 − g3) = 0,
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which also does not have an explicit solution and will need to be solved numerically.
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Appendix B - Experiment
Figure 7: Screenshot of the Experiment Interface
Figure 8: The 28 Experiment Tasks
34
Figure 9: The Seven Problems in Agranov and Ortoleva (2017
In the experiment, the two lotteries were not presented in this tabular format. However
the implementation of the experiment implicitly set the outcomes of lotteries to be
state-dependent. Interested readers can find the procedural details of the experiment
in the paper and its online supplemental material.
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Appendix C- Deterministic Choice Rules
Expected Utility(EU)
Under EU, an individual behaves as if compares the two expected utilities EU(f ) =
∑3
1 pif (si ) and EU(g) =
∑3
1 pif (si ) and choose the act that has a higher expected util-
ity.
Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU)
RDEU differs from EU only in that an individual does not use the given objective proba-
bilities to calculate the expected utility. Instead, probabilities are distorted according to
the rank of the three payoffs. Let f1 ≤ f2 ≤ f3 such the three payoffs that is ranked in an

















where w(.) is a probability weighting function weakly increasing in [0,1] and w(0) =
0,w(1) = 1. Note that if w(.) is linear RDEU reduces to EU. A convex w(.) leads to over-
weight of bad outcomes and therefore represents a pessimistic attitude. Similarly a con-
cave w(.) represents an optimistic attitude.
In our problem there are three states and the probabilities are kept as the same across
all problems. Therefore, for each subject we only need to estimate two distorted proba-
bilities, which are assumed to be used for all problems. We write the evaluation of the
two alternatives as follows.
RDEU(f ) = p̃1u(f1) + p̃2u(f2) + (1− p̃1 − p̃2)u(f3)
RDEU(g) = p̃1u(g1) + p̃2u(g2) + (1− p̃1 − p̃2)u(g3)
where we have either p̃1 ≤ p̃2 ≤ 1 − p̃1 − p̃2 or p̃1 ≥ p̃2 ≥ 1 − p̃1 − p̃2. In the special case
when p̃1 = p̃2 =
1
3 , RDEU reduces to EU.
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Salience Theory under Risk (ST)
ST postulates that probability distortion is state-dependent. In RDEU, the evaluation
of a lottery would not depend on how the state-contingent payoffs of one alternative
correlate with of the other lottery. But in ST, how probabilities are distorted exactly
by contrasting the the two payoffs of the two lotteries in each state. It postulates that
individuals over weights the probability of the the most salient states. The salience of















|f (si )−g(si )|
|f (si )|+|g(si )|
if |f (si )|+ |g(si )| , 0
0 if |f (si )|+ |g(si )| = 0.













, p̂1 + p̂2 + p̂2 = 1


































Therefore, the Salience adjusted Expected Utility is calculated as follows.



















RT postulates that when an individual evaluates an alternative, she would take into
account what she can obtain if she had chosen otherwise. Different functions forms had
been given by Fishburn (1982), Bell (1982) and Loomes and Sugden (1982), which is the
one this paper adopt.
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Denote a preference relation as . We use the tractable Loomes and Sugden (1982),





piQ(u(fsi )−u(gsi )) ≥ 0. (12)
whereQ(.) is a strictly increasing, skew-symmetric and convex function. Here we further
assume it has the function form that Q(x) = xα . When α = 1 RT reduces to EU. α > 1
repRESCnts regret aversion.
Based on equation (12), we can write the evaluation of the two acts as follows
RTEU(f ) =
∑3
i IipiQ(u(fsi )−u(gsi )) (13)
RTEU(g) =
∑3
















1, if fsi ≥ gsi
0, if fsi < gsi
.
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Appendix D - Empirical Performance of a General Version
of RESC
We also estimated the following general version of RESC by replacing this expected
value with expected utility. Therefore we assume an agent choose a stochastic choice
function that maximizes the following objective function
U(ρ) = u(x1) +u(x2) +u(x3)
where
xi = ρv(fi ) + (1− ρ)v(gi ), , i = 1,2,3 (15)
where v(x) = −
exp(−rx)
r , which is a CARA utility function. The risk attitude toward ran-
domizing probability can be separately estimated as the r parameter in v(·). The subjects
can be viewed as second-order expected utility maximizer (Segal 1990). Doing so would
involve introducing an extra parameter. By LRT, the generalization of RESC generates
extra statistical improvement for only 11 subjects comparing to the the RESC studied in
section 4 and 5. Additionally, most subjects are not risk averse when dealing with the
stochastic choice probability (Fig 10).
39
Figure 10: Estimated Randomization Risk Aversion
We fit each subject’s data into the general version of RSEC to obtain the Maximum
Likelihood estimates for r in equation 15t). It represents an subject’s aversion to
randomization risk. Most of the values are closes to 0. This indicates the majority
of subjects are neutral to this type of risk.
Appendix E- Stochastic ChoiceGenerated byDeterministic
Preferences
The strain of literature initiated by Machina (1985) does provide richer information
about the origin of choice stochasticity. The two most influential examples are Fuden-
berg et al’s (2015) Additive Perturbed Utility (APU) and Ortoleva et al’s (2017, 2019)
”deliberate stochastic” (DS) and cautious stochastic choice (CSC). The former generates
stochastic choice because of a cost function, which could be meaningfully interpreted as
the cost of learning or the cost of attention. The latter introduces a max-min structure,
which can be interpreted as being cautious or pessimistic. RESC generates stochastic
choice by balancing the expected payoff between different states.
The intersect between SCGDP and RU model is not an empty-set. APU is neither a
special case nor a generalization RU model, though both logit and probit, due to their
stringent functional form, are special cases of both RU and APU. There are several differ-
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ent characteristics of SCGDP and RU. As the first effort to axiomatize stochastic choice
function with acyclicity, APU assumes an elegant and estimable functional form. APU
inherited both the advantages of SCGDP - generated by deterministic preference - and
the advantages of RU - the separation of the deterministic component and the stochastic
component. An important generalization of APU into multi-attribute alternatives can
be found in Allen and Rehbeck (2019ab). RESC cannot be expressed as APU or RU be-
cause it can violate regularity. Additionally, APU and RU usually consider the discrete
set as the menu, while RESC considers the acts or state-dependent lottery as primitive.
Both APU and RESC can violate stochastic transitivity. Both models cannot be repre-
sented with a utility plus error. Both models have well-defined parameters ready to
be estimated. RESC is similar to DS and CSC, in the sense that both relax regularity
and both may be considered the relaxing of consequentialism. RESC is different from
DS and CSC as RESC is a simple maximization of expectation, considers the space of
acts, relaxes probability sophistication, and most importantly, relaxes the reduction of
compound lottery to enable the discrimination of risk probability and stochastic choice
probability.
There are several other lines of literature try to rationalize the stochastic component
in choices. Motivated by neurophysiological evidence, one possible source of stochastic
choice is considered to be the noise in signal and signal-processing (Woodford 2014);
in this line of research the preference is not necessarily fluctuating but the cognitive
processes can. Bounded rationality is sufficient to generate the stochastic choice in a de-
terministic setting, even if the indifference curves in the Marschak-Machina triangle are
linear (Stoye 2015). Another approach is based on the bounded rationality of decision-
maker who optimally acquires costly information (among others, see Sims 2003; Caplin,
Dean, and Leahy 2019). The rational inattention models maximize a generalized expec-
tation minus attention cost. It explains better than random utility models in decision
with time variation (Webb 2019) and decisions with information acquisition. The earli-
est dynamic stochastic choice model generated by optimizing long-term rewards might
be credited to Thompson (1933); it is plausible that stochastic choice is a result of sam-
pling and learning (Natenzon 2017).
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